Iran's Nuclear Program - Who Knows What?

The recent United States National Intelligence Estimate stated Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Interestingly, the current estimate contradicts the 2005 NIE, which stated Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Supposedly, Iran canceled its program in response to international pressure. However, Iran staked out an anti-Western agenda long ago; therefore, are we expected to believe Iran no longer intends to build a nuclear arsenal?

United States - The NIE assessed with high confidence that Iran suspended its pursuit of nuclear weapons in 2003. Up until then, Iran was focused on procuring these weapons. However, the NIE then states:

We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

Even if Iran did not restart its internal weapons program, nothing rules out their possible purchase, or trade, for a nuclear weapon. In all likelihood, if Iran did not buy a nuke, they probably would not use the publicly known enrichment locations such as Bushehr and Natanz. Back to the NIE:

We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities rather than its declared nuclear sites for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.

Immediately after the release of the NIE, Israel argued the United States' assessment was at least flawed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen was dispatched to Tel Aviv to meet with senior Israeli military, intelligence, and political officials to discuss the differences in the two countries' opinion of Iran's nuclear intentions. So what does Israel know?

Israel - Although there is no "smoking gun" piece of Israeli intelligence to counter the NIE, the two countries differ on the interpretation of current indicators. Israel points out that if Iran truly dismantled its weapons program in 2003, why did it not proclaim this to the world? While Israel may or may not have additional intelligence on Iran's intentions, the Israelis certainly have legitimate reason to remain vigilant on Iran.

Russia - Nuclear fuel has been shipped to Iran. An additional 80 tons of nuclear fuel are to be delivered in the next two months. Russia has also stated an attack on Iran is an attack on Russia. The probable Russian business interest outweighs any concern over whether or not Iran actually produces nuclear weapons. Of course, the Russians can always fall back on "they told us it was for peaceful purposes only!!"

Iran - Only the Iranians know what the status of their nuclear weapons program is. Since their nuclear energy program is moving forward, they announced they will build a second plant in Darkhovein. And, the delivery of nuclear fuel from Russia would not stop enrichment activity in Natanz.

What are we to make of this?

The moderate confidence of the NIE suggests there are many things we do not know. In one sense, Iran perceives the West to be wearing egg on its face because of the constant statements, prior to the NIE's release, that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The NIE recognizes that any Iranian nuclear weapon program would likely be secret, underground (literally and figuratively), and not near any currently known nuclear locations.

To paraphrase a European diplomat, who has experience as a foreign service officer in Tehran, "We know they lie about everything, the question is what do we about it?"

Iran may have abandoned its nuclear weapons program for its own use. But, Iran has already shown it will act through proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iraq insurgent groups) to accomplish its anti-West goals. Perhaps the Iranians have put aside their own ambitions for a nuclear arsenal in favor of packaging a nuclear product for proxy use. If so, the threat is as palpable as ever.

Israel and the Information War

Charlie, over at Op-For, correctly raises the grave importance of the information war should Israel take offensive action against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Although the IDF is prepared to begin operating in Gaza, the specter of the Summer 2006 war in Lebanon causes all involved to counsel prudence. Even though many believe Israel was the "loser" and Hezbollah "won," the view in the Middle East is quite different.

Hezbollah's leader, Sheik Hasan Nasrallah, admitted in a television interview that if he had known the consequences of kidnapping Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, he would have never continued with the operation. The result of the kidnapping operation? Lebanon's infrastructure was severely damaged by the IDF air force. Thousands of Lebanese were driven from their homes. Most western nations realized, and admitted, Hezbollah is nothing more than an Iranian proxy. However, the ultimate blow was the greater Arab sentiment that Hezbollah made an enormous mistake and should never have engaged in the operation.

Today, FoxNews reports Hamas is preparing to repel a possible Israeli offensive into the Gaza Strip. One gunman is quoted as saying:

"The U.S. and Israel and other regional powers were generous enough to provide Fatah security with very good weapons, and now they are in our hands."

Assuming this comment is true, it begs the question of whether Fatah has handed over the weapons it received to Hamas. One could argue Hamas and Fatah are getting along better than what is reported in the media. Behind closed doors, Mahmoud Abbas and Khaled Meshaal could have agreed to the following:

Abbas: Khaled, please continue to spout virulent anti-Israel and anti-West rhetoric. If you do so, I will provide you with the weapons we received from the western powers.

Meshaal: Mahmoud, I would be honored to continue the war against the occupiers. Also, could you please send some of your newly-trained security personnel to us? We would like to compare the West's tactics with those we learned from the Al-Qods force.

Abbas: I would be delighted to do so.

Could this conversation have happened? Perhaps. Both Hamas and Fatah have the same goal, ridding the world of Israel. If they looked past their differences and began to work collaboratively, these groups could be on the verge of completely fooling the Western world. Abbas said all the right things at Annapolis to imply he's interested in a peaceful, two-state solution. Nevertheless, the two-state solution has been on the table for over a decade, but has never been acted upon.

The common thread between today's Hamas press release and the releases of Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 is the continued propaganda war against Israel. Lebanon still smarts from the destruction wrought by Hezbollah's ill-conceived plan to kidnap Israeli soldiers. Gaza has been reduced to a shantytown since Hamas seized power from Fatah. The closing of the Karni crossing, from Gaza to Israel, has resulted in Gaza businesses losing thousands in revenue because they are unable to trade goods in Israel.

In both of these cases, Israel has been reactive. Israel has responded to the brazen attacks of Hamas and Hezbollah. However, Israel has not been at the forefront of the information war in an effort to win popular, international support for its actions. Should Hamas step up its attacks, Israel will likely respond decisively. Therefore, before judging the severity of any Israeli reaction, one should take into account what brought the reaction in the first place.