Iran's Nuclear Program - Who Knows What?

The recent United States National Intelligence Estimate stated Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Interestingly, the current estimate contradicts the 2005 NIE, which stated Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Supposedly, Iran canceled its program in response to international pressure. However, Iran staked out an anti-Western agenda long ago; therefore, are we expected to believe Iran no longer intends to build a nuclear arsenal?

United States - The NIE assessed with high confidence that Iran suspended its pursuit of nuclear weapons in 2003. Up until then, Iran was focused on procuring these weapons. However, the NIE then states:

We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

Even if Iran did not restart its internal weapons program, nothing rules out their possible purchase, or trade, for a nuclear weapon. In all likelihood, if Iran did not buy a nuke, they probably would not use the publicly known enrichment locations such as Bushehr and Natanz. Back to the NIE:

We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities rather than its declared nuclear sites for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.

Immediately after the release of the NIE, Israel argued the United States' assessment was at least flawed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen was dispatched to Tel Aviv to meet with senior Israeli military, intelligence, and political officials to discuss the differences in the two countries' opinion of Iran's nuclear intentions. So what does Israel know?

Israel - Although there is no "smoking gun" piece of Israeli intelligence to counter the NIE, the two countries differ on the interpretation of current indicators. Israel points out that if Iran truly dismantled its weapons program in 2003, why did it not proclaim this to the world? While Israel may or may not have additional intelligence on Iran's intentions, the Israelis certainly have legitimate reason to remain vigilant on Iran.

Russia - Nuclear fuel has been shipped to Iran. An additional 80 tons of nuclear fuel are to be delivered in the next two months. Russia has also stated an attack on Iran is an attack on Russia. The probable Russian business interest outweighs any concern over whether or not Iran actually produces nuclear weapons. Of course, the Russians can always fall back on "they told us it was for peaceful purposes only!!"

Iran - Only the Iranians know what the status of their nuclear weapons program is. Since their nuclear energy program is moving forward, they announced they will build a second plant in Darkhovein. And, the delivery of nuclear fuel from Russia would not stop enrichment activity in Natanz.

What are we to make of this?

The moderate confidence of the NIE suggests there are many things we do not know. In one sense, Iran perceives the West to be wearing egg on its face because of the constant statements, prior to the NIE's release, that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The NIE recognizes that any Iranian nuclear weapon program would likely be secret, underground (literally and figuratively), and not near any currently known nuclear locations.

To paraphrase a European diplomat, who has experience as a foreign service officer in Tehran, "We know they lie about everything, the question is what do we about it?"

Iran may have abandoned its nuclear weapons program for its own use. But, Iran has already shown it will act through proxies (Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iraq insurgent groups) to accomplish its anti-West goals. Perhaps the Iranians have put aside their own ambitions for a nuclear arsenal in favor of packaging a nuclear product for proxy use. If so, the threat is as palpable as ever.